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Over the last two decades, many developed countries have experienced notable changes 
in house prices. This exploratory study considers if house price movements in the UK 
can be linked to the political cycle as governments realise homeowners represent a large 
portion of the voter base and their voting decisions could be influenced by the 
magnitude and direction of house price changes. Specifically, the paper investigates 
whether house prices behave differently before and after elections and under different 
political regimes. To examine this relationship, the study analyzed quarterly UK 
national house price data since 1960, along with data on the results of UK parliamentary 
elections during the same period. Over this period, real UK house prices increased by 
an average of 2.84% per annum. While there is no evidence that house prices in the UK 
behave significantly differently under different political parties, it is evident that house 
prices perform much better in the last year before an election, compared to the first year 
after an election. Over the time period defined for this study, house prices increased by 
5.3% per annum on the average in the last year before an election compared to 1.3% 
per annum in the first year following an election. As this research clearly identifies 
major variations in house price performance around election times, residential property 
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1.      INTRODUCTION  
Housing is a unique and valuable asset class. It is a key component of social wellbeing 
in providing shelter and as a source of economic activity through new residential 
housing supply and on-going housing alternations and maintenance requirements. 
Importantly, for most individuals and families in the UK, housing represents their main 
investment. Therefore, a vibrant and sound housing market is an important component 
of the UK’s prosperity and, as such, controlling the various aspects of housing is clearly 
a core long-term government mandate.  
House price movements create a lot of interest and media coverage in the UK, in part, 
this is due to the residential ownership profile, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1:                                  UK Home Ownership Profile 
 
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2016 
Figure 1 shows the extent of private home ownership across the UK. There are 
approximately 28 million residential properties of which 63% are owner-occupied, with 
the owners either owning outright or paying off a mortgage on the property (ONS, 
2016).  
Although neo-classical economic theory suggests that house prices are determined by 
supply and demand forces, the housing market also operates within a dynamic open 
system, indicating that factors external to the housing system can impact on house 
prices. As housing is important to social wellbeing, governments often feel the need to 
regulate the housing market and since homeowners represent a large percentage of the 
voter base, housing-related policies implemented close to an election may influence 












A growing body of literature finds evidence to the effect that governments sometimes 
attempt to manage the economy in line with their own political motives by the use of 
both fiscal and monetary policy (see for example: Brender and Drazen 2005, 
Heckelman and Wood 2005). As monetary and fiscal policies are of fundamental 
importance to the housing and housing finance markets, the impact and consequences 
of politically-motivated decisions on the housing market can be considerable yet 
because of the complexities of housing systems, not all eventualities are predictable or 
taken into account. 
In acknowledging government’s responsibilities for housing, the type and timing of 
policies across various levels of government can have far-reaching effects on house 
prices. In detailing government housing policies, policy timing and implementation can 
be used to manage and stimulate the housing market. The impact of these policies on 
house prices could be gradual or immediate. If a link between house prices and the 
political cycle can be established, future research on house price dynamics and property 
cycles may be enriched by incorporating political variables. 
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to study the behaviour of house prices in 
relation to the UK political environment. This is achieved by examining real house price 
performance over time for the UK residential housing market. For this research, UK 
house price data from 1960 to date was used. In grouping house price movement before 
and after elections, the impact of the political cycle can be compared to long-term 
average real residential property returns.  
It should be noted that this research is not intended to endorse particular political 
parties, but rather to illustrate an approach for evaluating the impact of the political 
cycles on house prices. Similarly, it is outside the scope of this research to examine 
specific political factors which have impacted house prices. 
Following this introduction, Section Two provides a literature review on the housing 
market and political cycles. Section Three details the selected national residential 
property market data with national political elections and the research methodology. 
Section Four provides the empirical findings and the implications thereof. The last 
section provides the concluding comments and recommendations.   
 
2.      LITERATURE REVIEW   
A vast amount of literature exists attempting to model national and regional house price 
movements. Single country time series, as well as multi-country studies, abound 
explaining house price movements. Among the leading research looking at the UK 
housing market are the works of Meen (2001), Muellbauer & Murphy (1997), Taltavull 
de la Paz & White (2012), White (2015), and Whitehead & Williams (2011). The basic 
neoclassical theory of house price determination is that house prices are set by the 
interaction supply and demand functions and a process of price adjustment which bring 
demand and supply into balance (Muellbauer 2012). House price movements are 
therefore linked to a host of supply and demand side variables.  
According to Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), factors that influence demand for housing  in 
the long run include: 
 Growth in household disposable income 
 Demographic changes 
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 Changes in aspects of tax system that might encourage home ownership over 
other forms of wealth accumulation 
 Long-term interest rates 
 Inflation 
 Availability and cost of land 
 Construction costs  
 Investments in the improvement of existing housing stock.  
 
On the other hand, in the short term, factors such as the length of planning restrictions 
and construction phases and inertia in existing planning systems may constrain growth 
in housing stock, thereby affecting house prices. Throughout the literature on house 
price determination, it is widely acknowledged that imperfection and inefficiency exist 
in the residential housing market and as such systemic mispricing can persist 
(Muellbauer, 2012).  
Economic theory, however, has evolved with major milestones providing new ways of 
thinking about the nature and theory of managing economic markets. Work by Marx 
(1867), Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1962) have introduced new concepts that have 
shaped economic strategies. Importantly, Keynes (1936) acknowledged the role of 
government to use all powers at their disposal to influence aggregated demand.  
Importantly, governments have available fiscal measures including changes in tax rate 
and spending, alongside monetary measures associated with the management and 
supply of money. Neo-classical economic analysis of the housing market links the 
housing market to the macroeconomy mainly via changes in interest rates and 
availability of credit to households. However, as monetary and fiscal policies are of 
fundamental significance to housing and housing finance market, the impact and 
consequences of politically-motivated decisions on the housing market can be 
considerable (King, 2009).   
As Higgins and Reddy (2011) illustrated, the extent to which government policies do 
impact on the housing market can be examined by considering the structure of the 
property market, using the basic three-market model of the property market proposed 
by Ling & Archer, (2007). This simplified model is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2   A Model of the Property Market Structure 
 
Adapted from Ling & Archer (2007)  
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Figure 2 indicates that the performance of the real estate market is influenced by a host 
of forces impacting on the space, capital and the property market. Within this 
framework, it can easily be appreciated that several policy-influenced decisions may 
impact on house prices. Among the key government policies that may influence UK 
house prices are presented below:  
Space market (Demand/occupier)  
- Population policies (quotas on migration) 
- First time home buyers, incentives 
- Opportunities for overseas owners to purchase residential properties 
 
i)   Capital market (Finance) 
- Monetary policies (money supply, government bonds) 
- Changes in property taxes (transaction tax - stamp duty) 
- Regulations that impact on alternative asset classes 
- Changes in pension/superannuation policies (in an indirect way) 
 
ii) Property market (Property market conditions and supply) 
- Release/rezoning of new residential land 
- Changes in planning policies (housing density) 
- Building regulations (sustainability agenda) 
Source: Higgins and Reddy, 2010 
 
In providing the tools to manage the economy, government actions may be politically 
motivated to assist in the election of governments. Nordhuas (1975) presented the 
“Political Business Cycle” theory suggesting government policies can manipulate the 
economy for electoral gain. These have been identified in three key areas: 
i) Macroeconomic outcomes: economic growth, lower inflation and lower 
unemployment etc.  
ii) Beneficial rewards: voter tax breaks etc. 
iii) Monetary policy: money supply and interest rates (in some countries interest 
rates are set independently by an appointed organisation, for example, Bank of 
England).  
 Source: Ladewig (2008) 
In detailing government strategies that can affect the political business cycle, there is 
criticism that the literature is often theoretically and empirically weak surrounding these 
key areas (Drazen 2000, Keech 1995 and Suzuki 1991). Contrary to the debatable links 
to the economy, research, particularly in the US, has coupled the political business cycle 
to investment asset classes. The relationship to equity and bond markets is centred on 
the performance of the asset classes, with reference to the political parties that were in 
power. Available studies provide conflicting evidence as to which political party 
provided overall better returns (Ramchander et al 2009, Santa Clara and Valkanov 
2003). 
Berry and Dalton (2004) likewise commented on the security of a “bricks-and-mortar” 
investment being supported in the past and continued to be influenced by Australian 
government housing and social policies. The persistence of government policy 
interventions can change housing market outcomes with a range of effects, some being 
unintended and some contradictory.   
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In summary, many house price drivers have links to government macroeconomic 
policies, which are made within a political framework. Consequently, in this 
environment, housing outcomes, although difficult to validate, can be an important 
election vote winner as homeowners represent a large voter base. 
  
3.      METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Data 
Across the UK, determinants of the residential property markets can vary with local 
influences. Although, historically, there is a limited divergence of long-term regional 
performance from that of the overall UK housing market performance. Figure 3 
illustrates long-term UK nominal house price movement since 1960. 
 
Figure 3     UK Nominal House Prices: 1960-2017 
 
Source: Nationwide 2017 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the movement in nominal UK house prices. The quarterly house 
price movement represents 2.03% (annualised 8.63%). The level of movement varies 
over time with substantial growth occurring from the mid-1990s till the onset of the 
GFC of 2007/08, leading to a correction which lasted close to two years but rapid 
appreciation kicked in again with house prices exceeding pre-crisis levels by the last 
quarter of 2014. 
In detailing UK house price movement, annualised UK inflation ranged -1.6% to 26.6% 
over this time period (ONS, 2017). The changes in inflation would impact on a 
comparison of different time periods. Therefore the research examined real house price 
movement with inflation removed. This approach best reflects the movement in house 
prices separate from external factors. 
The democratic political system in the UK has been in operation since 1707 with the 
union of England and Scotland.  Key political decisions are made at a national level 
under the UK parliamentary democracy system with House of Commons and House of 
Lords. The central government elections are held on a five-yearly basis with non-































































































































































Since 1918, the UK political system has been dominated by two partie; Conservatives 
(Republicans) and Labour (Democrats). Table 1 shows the national governments and 
the election dates since 1960. To coincide with the quarterly property data, the election 
dates are shown after the election on a quarterly basis.  













Harold Macmillan Conservative 08-Oct-59 Dec-59 Dec-64 20 
      
Harold Wilson Labour 15-Oct-64 Dec-64 Jun-70 30 
 Election 31-Mar-66 Mar-66   
      
Edward Heath Conservative 18-Jun-70 Jun-70 Mar-74 15 
      
Harold Wilson Labour 28-Feb-74 Mar-74 Jun-79 21 
 Election 10-Oct-74 Dec-74   
      
Margaret Thatcher Conservative 03-May-79 Jun-79 Jun-97 76 
 Election 09-Jun-83 Jun-83   
John Major Election 11-Jun-87 Jun-87   
 Election 09-Apr-92 Jun-92   
      
Tony Blair Labour 01-May-97 Jun-97 Jun-10 52 
 Election 07-Jun-01 Jun-01   
Gordon Brown Election 05-May-05 Jun-05   
      
David Cameron Conservative 06-May-10* Jun-10 Sept-16 27 
 Election 07-May-15 Jun-15   
Theresa May  Election  08-Jun-17# Jun-17   
* Coalition government 
# Minority government 
    
Source: House of Commons Library: UK Election Statistics: 1918-2017 
Table 1 details the elected UK Prime Ministers for the past 58 years. There have been 
16 UK general elections since 1959 leading to six changes of government. On eight 
occasions the Conservatives won the most seats while Labour won the most seats on 
seven occasions. In 2010, the Conservatives won the most seats and entered government 
in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The shortest period of government was the 
Edward Heath, Conservative-led government (47 months), compared to Margaret 
Thatcher - John Major lead governments of over 15 years, having been re-elected three 
consecutive times. 
 
3.2. Methodology   
To examine the relationship between the political cycle and house price movements, 
the data was initially examined using descriptive statistics over each decade beginning 
from 1960. In addition, the performance of house prices during each elected national 
political party was examined over the defined time period. 
In analysing the performance of the political parties, the political cycle can be examined 
using the performance of the UK house prices one year before and one-year post-
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election. An important consideration while interpreting the results is that the data only 
accounts for governments that have served more than an 18-month post-election period.  
In testing the robustness of the results, the analysis compared different performance 
periods over the dataset. Statistical significance (t-test) provided inconclusive evidence 
that the means of the two groups were statistically different. It is possible that any house 
price movement and the political cycle relationship are simply due to co-movements 
with external factors, for example, global financial crisis and natural disasters. 
 
4.      RESULTS 
The first step was to review the descriptive statistics for the UK residential property 
market over a 10-year interval. This is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2        Changes UK Real House Prices Descriptive Statistics: 1960-2017 
 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's 2010-17 Total 
Mean 3.34% 4.35% 3.77% -1.36% 5.40% 1.31% 2.84% 
Median 2.52% 1.44% 5.31% -0.46% 8.28% 1.79% 2.51% 
Standard Deviation 4.43% 15.77% 10.70% 9.88% 11.79% 6.48% 10.70% 
Range 18.26% 78.90% 59.79% 36.04% 59.94% 32.10% 78.90% 
Minimum -4.23% -27.99% -17.42% -22.33% -26.42% -15.14% -27.99% 
Maximum 14.03% 50.91% 42.36% 13.71% 33.52% 16.96% 50.91% 
Table 2 shows that over the last five decades, the average annual percentage change in 
real UK house prices ranged from 18.26% in the 1960’s to 59.94% in the 2000’s. The 
2000’s provided strong returns (5.40%), being 90% above the long-term trend (2.84%). 
The volatility in house price movement, especially from the 1970s to the last decade, 
was very close to the long-term average of 10.70%.  
Besides examining the mean and the variation from the mean (standard deviation), the 
shape of the data can provide valuable information. The skewness shows the symmetry 
of the data around the mean (low figure preferred) and the kurtosis illustrates the 
“peakedness” of the data. A high kurtosis reading (above zero) means the data is 
grouped close to the mean. In each decade, the low skewness and low kurtosis readings 
demonstrate a flat bell curve as illustrated by high standard deviation readings above 
8% (except for the 1960’s and 2010’s which had relatively stable house price growth), 
with a narrow data range of 18.26% and 32.10% respectively. This shows that the 
movement in residential property market can be substantial and unrelated to movement 
in inflation. 
Next, the study examined whether the performance of house prices vary under different 
political regimes. The descriptive statistics for UK house price performance under 
different political parties is shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3          Changes in UK House Prices under Different Political Parties 
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 Labour Conservative Overall 
Mean 2.89% 2.80% 2.84% 
Median 3.56% 2.09% 2.51% 
Standard Deviation 10.82% 10.65% 10.70% 
Range 60.0% 70.0% 74.0% 
Minimum -23.1% -19.1% -23.1% 
Maximum 36.9% 50.9% 50.9% 
Count 86 112 198 
Table 3 details a relatively narrow annual house price range, 2.80% to 2.89%, between 
the political parties. This represents a relatively small difference of ± 2% from the 
overall average of 2.84%. The standard deviation difference would suggest that Labour 
governments have slightly more volatile returns than that of the Conservative 
governments. Across the political parties, similarities appear to be evident with low 
skewness and low kurtosis readings.  
A t-test was used to examine if the performance of house prices varied significantly 
under different political regimes. The results are displayed in Table 4. 






T test df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.090 1.538 .059 196.000 .953 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.090 1.541 .058 181.563 .953 
As evidenced from the results shown in Table 4, the t-test shows that there is no 
statistically significant difference (t-values significantly less than 2), at 95% confidence 
level, in UK house price performance either under the Labour Party or Conservative 
Party lead House of Commons. The minor difference between the two parties may be 
attributable to sampling variation, given that the labour party has been in power for 86 
quarters compared to 112 quarters of the Conservative government during the period 
observed in this study. 
Table 5 compares the UK house price performance during the first and last years of 
government by the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. In other words, we 
examine the behaviour of the of house prices just before and immediately after elections 




Table 5             Governments First Year and Last Year Election Performance 
 Conservative Government Labour Government 
Combined 
Conservative. & Labour 
 First Year Last Year First Year Last Year First Year Last Year 
Mean 1.06% 4.43% 1.73% 6.70% 1.32% 5.25% 
Median 0.98% 4.95% 4.57% 5.22% 2.28% 4.87% 
S.D 4.13% 3.61% 5.51% 4.61% 4.66% 3.99% 
Range 37.48% 35.89% 47.13% 45.17% 50.80% 55.03% 
Minimum -14.47% -13.00% -23.13% -6.26% -23.13% -13.00% 
Maximum 19.03% 19.46% 15.96% 36.86% 19.03% 36.86% 
Table 5 illustrates nominal differences in UK house price performance during the first 
year of Labour and Conservative governments. The average annual percentage change 
in UK house price during the first term of Labour governments was 1.73%, slightly 
above the 1.06% recorded by the Conservative governments.  A t-test shows that this 
difference is not statistically significant at 95% confidence level. In their last years in 
power, labour governments recorded average annualised growth rate of 6.70% 
compared to 4.33% under the Conservative government. This difference, once again, is 
not statistically significant at 95% confidence level. The difference in performance at 
Central government level may be related to expenditure policies as Anderson et al 
(2008) argued that left-of-centre governments are more concerned with controlling 
unemployment than right-of-centre governments. 
Nonetheless, Table 5 reveals a more striking observation; It is perceived (in the last two 
columns) that UK house prices perform much better in the year before an election 
(irrespective of the party in power), compared to the first year after an election. Average 
year-on-year house prices increased by 5.25% in the last years before an election 
compared to 1.32% in the first years following an election. This implies average house 
price performance in the years before an election is about 85% above the long term 
average (2.84%) and about four times the performance in the first year after an election. 
On the contrary, average house price performance one year after an election is about 
53% below the long term average. 
In analysing the results, there appears to be a strong case that political parties see house 
prices as a key consideration prior to elections. This finding could also suggest that 
elections in the UK are usually held during periods of booms in the housing market 
(and perhaps the economy as a whole). This may be so since Prime Ministers are at 
liberty to call for elections at any time and would mostly do so only if they deem there 
to be a high chance of victory for their party. A strong housing market could be 
connected with a flourishing economy and serve as an indicator that the party in power 
may win the election. 
While it may be the case that house prices fare well in periods of general economic 
boom, it is also plausible that given the disproportionate fraction of homeowners in the 
UK, political parties would use strong house price growth as a tool to secure more votes 
during elections. In such cases, pre-emptive policies by governments to support or 
stabilise house prices in the short-term could, at a later stage, inflate house prices. The 
long term effect on economic growth could be acutely suppressed by affordability 
issues across the residential property markets. 
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5.      CONCLUSION 
This study represents a preliminary systematic empirical examination of the influence 
of political cycle on UK house prices. By examining the long-term performance of real 
house prices in the UK, the study examined how house prices react to central 
government elections.  Over the last five decades, real UK house prices increased by an 
annualised return of 2.84%. There appears to be limited variance in UK house price 
movement between the elected Labour and Conservative governments. However, the 
most striking finding of the analysis is that there is significant variation in house price 
movements one year before, compared to one year after the House of Commons 
elections. UK house price performance is significantly better in the year before an 
election compared to one-year post-election. In quantitative terms, this represents a 
ratio of about 1:4. This finding holds irrespective of the political party in power.  
In recognising policymakers’ active role in the management of house prices for political 
gain, the short-term benefits of appealing to a large number of voters may conceal 
underlying long-term flaws in the residential property market. Leaving these issues 
unaddressed could be more complex than often perceived. 
These findings identify an array of potential areas of further study. By placing political 
cycles as part of the residential property research agenda, those that are linked to the 
residential property markets should include the election timings as part of the decision 
making process. Further research in this area will shed more light on the connections 
between house prices and the political cycles. This can include the performance of the 
housing market under regime changes compared to elections that keep the status quo 
which do not result in regime change. Political studies research may also benefit from 
improved models predicting electoral victories if housing market performance variables 
were considered. 
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